Accident and Malpractice Liability of Professional Corporation Shareholders by Prins, Richard Tunis
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 10
1977 
Accident and Malpractice Liability of Professional Corporation 
Shareholders 
Richard Tunis Prins 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard T. Prins, Accident and Malpractice Liability of Professional Corporation Shareholders, 10 U. MICH. 
J. L. REFORM 364 (1977). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol10/iss2/8 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
ACCIDENT AND MALPRACTICE LIABILITY OF 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION SHAREHOLDERS 
Historically, the inability of professionals1 to incorporate their 
practices 2 meant that each member of a professional group practice 
was jointly and severally liable for all tortious harm arising from 
services rendered by any other member or employee on behalf of 
the organization. 3 During the past fifteen years, however, special 
professional corporation legislation has been enacted in every 
state. 4 Most of these acts exempt all shareholders from liability for 
tortious harm arising from services rendered by any other 
shareholder or employee on behalf of the corporation. 5 
1 Most state professional corporation acts use the term "professional" broadly ,to denote 
services performable only pursuant to a license granted by the state; however, many statutes 
deny use of their provisions to those who can legally incorporate under any other act. See, 
e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-902.5, 10-903.A (Supp. i975); CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 
13401, 13402 (West Supp. 1975). Physicians, dentists, lawyers, and accountants are the least 
likely to be able to incorporate under any other act. See cases collected in Willcox, 
Hospitals and the Corporate Practice of Medicine, 45 CORNELL L. REv. 432, 442-43 (1960); 
Wormser, Corporations and the Practice of Law, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 207, 208-14 (1936). 
This note limits its discussion to these four professions because they are the prime benefici-
aries of professional corporation legislation and because relevant information is lacking 
concerning other professions. Special account will be taken of physicians. They have 
utilized the professional corporation form far more than other professionals. See Hayes, 
Professional Corporations in Iowa - 1970-1972, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 161, 162 (1975) (Health 
care professionals utilize 90 percent of Iowa's professional corporations.) Furthermore, 
pertinent accident data is much more complete and recent for physicians than for any other 
profession. 
2 Jones, The Professional Corporation, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 353 (1958). 
3 Three forms of business organization were open to professionals wishing to. engage in 
group practice. The only common one, the partnership, is always characterized by full and 
independent liability of each general partner for torts committed by any partner or employee 
of the partnership. See note 16 infra. The rarely used joint stock company is generally 
characterized by joint and several liability. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPOR-
ATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 54 (1970). Only a minority of the states 
invariably impose joint and several liability on the occasionally employed business trust; a 
larger group imposes such liability where, as is li.kely in business trusts formed to provide 
professional services, full control is exercised by the beneficiaries. Id. at § 64. 
4 Shores, Professional Corporations, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691, 694 (1974). 
5 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 46, §§ 350, 359; tit. 10, § 21(41) (Cum. Supp. 1973). The 
statement in the text is based upon the author's examination of over forty of the state 
statutes. As in the Alabama legislation just cited, the most prevalent provision merely states 
that no change is intended. In such an absence of a positive provision, the incorporation by 
reference of all nonconflicting business corporation law means that the limited liability 
characteristic of business corporations also characterizes professional corporations. Al-
though the shareholders are subject to no liability as a legal matter, their corporation is fully 
liable by virtue of the doctrine of enterprise liability. See James, Vicarious Liability, 28 TuL. 
L. REv. 161 (1954). Thus, each shareholder is, in effect, liable to the extent of his or her 
share in the corporation's assets. This de facto liability is called "limited liability," both in 
contrast to the broader legal standard of joint and several liability and because it is limited to 
each shareholder's share in the corporate assets. 
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This shift to limited tort liability warrants examination for sev-
eral reasons. First, shareholder nonliability finds scantjustification 
in the basic policy of the professional corporation acts in modifying 
traditional corporate qualities whenever necessary to preserve the 
public protection objectives of professional licensing laws, which 
for many years had been held to prohibit the formation of profes-
sional corporations. 6 Reducing liability would seem to be discor-
dant with the special responsibilities placed upon professionals by 
licensing laws. 7 Second, the only apparent justification for retain-
ing limited liability no longer exists. Professional corporation laws 
were enacted as a result of efforts by professionals to share in the 
federal tax advantages available to corporations. 8 Because the 
drafters of the early acts knew that the Internal Revenue Service 
would oppose treating professional corporations as corporations 
6 The professional licensing acts were designed to protect the public from ignorance, 
incompetence, and imposition. See, e.g., Funk Jewelry Co. v. State ex rel. La Prade, 46 
Ariz. 348. 50 P.2d 945 (1935); Willcox, supra note I. at 445. But cf. Gellhom, The Abuse of 
Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1976) (discussion of substantial abuses by 
professional groups); notes 75-78 and accompanying text infra (professionals' abuse. of 
monopolies granted by licensing acts). The courts presented a series of evils that would 
occur if professionals were permitted to incorporate. Among the destructive aspects em-
phasized were commercial exploitation, gross corporate misconduct unreachable by the 
licensing authorities, and diversion of professional loyalty from clients to employers under 
the influence of lay control and the profit motive. See, e.g., People v. Pacific Health Corp., 
12 Cal. 2d 156. 82 P.2d 429 (1938). cert. denied, 306 U.S. 633 (1939). Parker v. Board of 
Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67 (1932); In re Cooperative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 
479, 92 N.E. 15, 16 (1910). The dangers asserted through the years are discussed in Jones, 
supra note 2, at 354-55. 
The modifications made in the state professional corporation acts to prevent these dangers 
while extending the business advantages of the corporate form can be grouped under five 
headings: 
I. All acts limit the permissible scope of business activity to one or two complementary 
professions and investments. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.45.240 (Supp. 1971); IOWA 
CODE§ 496C.4 (Supp. 1975). 
2. In order to ensure that no lay person can exert any control over professional decisions 
or derive any profit from the corporation, all acts place a series of restrictions on the issue, 
transfer, and voting of shares and on the qualifications of directors and officers. See, e.g., 
CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 1340l(c), 13403, 13406, 13407 (West Supp. 1975). 
3. Most state acts provide for close regulation of the corporation by the appropriate 
licensing authority. See, e.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 46, §§ 352, 353, 354,360,361, 364 (Cum. Supp. 
1973); CAL. CORP. CoDE §§ 13401(d), 13404, 13407, 13408 (West Supp. 1975). But see DEL. 
CoDE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 601-619 (1974) (no regulation of the corporation per se). 
4. Most acts obstruct or foreclose multistate practice. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 
I0-902(d)(4) (Supp. 1975). Contra, MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 319A.OI passim (Supp. 1975). This 
modification obviously protects local economic interests and bears only a tangential rela-
tionship to the values behind the licensing acts. · 
5. Some acts impose personal liability on shareholders for the torts of employees. With 
respect to contractual debt, however, these acts also grant shareholders limited liability. 
See. e.g .. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 10-905 (Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 708 
(1974); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 58.185 (1975). 
7 See Jones, supra note 2, at 361: Note. Professional Corporations and Associations, 75 
HARV. L. REV. 776. 788-90 (1962). 
" See K urzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97, IO I, I 06 (5th Cir. I 969); Note, supra note 7, 
at 777-78. 779-80. 784. 789. 
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for tax purposes9 and because thes.e acts departed substantially 
from the incidents of corporate form relevant to corporate tax 
treatment, 10 retention of the corporate feature of limited liability 
was potentially a crucial factor in the impending legal struggle with 
the Service. Once this battle was won in 1969, 11 limited liability 
was no longer essential to preserve the federal tax advantages 
originally sought by these acts. Finally, the malpractice crises 
affecting the various professions in the past few years have stimu-
lated extensive debate over the appropriate scope of professional 
liability12 and have, in combination with recent federal tax relief for 
unincorporated professionals, 13 accentuated the importance of lia-
bility differences between partnerships and corporations. 
Part I of this note describes the various tort liability provisions 
9 See United States v. Kintner. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954) (nonacquiescence of the 
Internal Revenue Service) (The court held that an association of physicians qualified as a 
corporation for federal tax purposes because the association agreement conferred sufficient 
corporate attributes on the association.); Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. 
Texas 1959); Shores, supra note 4, at 694; Note, supra note 7, at 784-85. 
10 In federal tax law a business organization must have more corporate than noncorporate 
characteristics in order to gain corporate tax status. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-l .2(a), T.D. 
6503, 1960-2 C.8. 409. Under this regulation, the restrictior:is discussed in note 6 supra 
would probably have been held by the Service to preclude corporate tax treatment for any 
professional corporation if the shareholders did not enjoy limited liability. See Kurzner v. 
United States, 413 F.2d 97, 104 (5th Cir. 1969); Note, supra note 7, at 783-84. 
" The 1965 amendments to the regulation cited in note 10 supra made it clear that the 
Service would oppose even those professional corporations possessing limited liability. See 
Treas. Reg. § 310.7701-1, 2(a), 2(h), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 C.B. 553. But after several rounds of 
adverse litigation, Kurzner v: United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969); O'Neill v. United 
States 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1967); 
Holder v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 160 (N .D. Ga. I %8), the Service conceded the issue. 
It stated that professional corporations would be taxed as corporations whether or not they 
had limited liability or any other corporate characteristics, if the state labeled them as 
corporations. T.I.R. 1019 (1969); Rev. Ru!. 70-101, 1970-1 C.8. 278. 
12 Compare the dissenting statement of Charles A. Hoffman in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, 
EDUC. & WELFARE, SECRETARY'S CoMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT 113, 
121-25 (1973) [hereinafter cited as REPORT] (advocating reduced liability to ease ill effects of 
malpractice crises), with Wagner, At the Core: The Patient, TRIAL, May/June 1975, at 44 
(advocating broad exposure to deter excessive levels of malpractice). 
13 The first major reduction in the tax advantages of the corporate form occurred in the 
Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-792, 76 Stat. 809 
(1%2), amending I.R.C. §§ 401-415. This legislation permitted self-employed individuals to 
deduct one-half of their contributions to a pension plan and postpone recognition of the 
income until its distribution. Shores, supra note 4, at 700 n.35; Comment, The Self-
Employed Individuals Retirement Act of 1962, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 519, 520 (1963). Total 
contributions to these plans were limited, and coverage and vesting requirements were 
imposed that did not apply to corporations. Comment, supra, at 520-30. The second major 
reduction in the tax advantages of the corporate form occurred as a result of the Employ-
ment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974), 
amending I.R.C. §§ 401-415 [ERISAJ. ERISA imposed significant limitations on corporate 
pension plans while liberalizing self-employed plans by, inter a/ia. repealing the 50 percent 
deductibility limitation. See Shores, supra note 4, at 699-711; Zalutsky, Comparison of a 
Professional Corporation and an Unincorporated Practice after ER/SA. 34 N.Y.U. INST. 
FED. TAXATION 1355 (1976). Shores concludes that in many situations ERISA may eliminate 
the tax advantages of the corporate form. Shores, supra, at 699-700. Zalutsky, on the other 
hand, believes that the advantages continue to favor incorporation. Zalutsky, supra, at 1359. 
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found in the professional corporation acts, focusing particularly on 
the recently published Model Professional Corporation Supple-
ment.14 Part II compares how effectively these alternatives ac-
complish the goals of accident law in the professional corporation 
setting. The inability of the preferred model provision to alleviate 
the malpractice problem in any way as well as proposals for rein-
vigoration of the professional corporation act concept are dis-
cussed in Part III. 
I. STATE AND MODEL TORT LIABILITY 
PROVISIONS 
The great majority of state professional corporation acts pro-
vide limited shareholder liability identical to that of shareholders 
in typical business corporations. 15 However, a few states subject 
professional corporation shareholders to the joint and several lia-
bility traditionally applied to partners. 16 Variations on each of 
these two statutory approaches also exist, 17 and a few states amal-
gamate both types by replacing joint and several liability with 
limited liability if a specified amount of liability insurance is main-
tained.18 
14 The Model Professional Corporation Supplement [hereinafter cited as "Model"] is a 
project of the American Bar Association's Committee on Corporate Laws. It was approved 
by the Committee after its second reading on June 25, 1976, and subsequently published for 
comments in the BUSINESS LA WYER. See Professional Corporation Supplement to the 
Model Business Corporation Act, 32 Bus. LAW. 289 (1976). A member of the Committee has 
informed the author that few changes are contemplated before final adoption and promulga-
tion in I 977. 
15 See note 5 supra. 
16 See note 6(5) supra. None of these states appears to have construed the nature of this 
liability authoritatively. Presumably, it would be closely analogous to the joint and several 
liability of partners. Case law under sections 13-15 of the Uniform Partnership Act, which 
now governs partner liability in forty-seven states, 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 5 (Supp. 1975), 
shows that partners are personally liable, either individually or in any combination the 
plaintiff may choose, for tortious acts of the firm or any of its partners, agents, or employees 
acting within the scope of their authority. See Phillips v. Cook, 239 Md. 215, 219-20, 223-24, 
210 A.2d 743, 746, 749 (1965); Martinoffv. Triboro Roofing, 228 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141-42 (Sup. 
Ct. 1962), Hardy & Newsome, Inc. v. Whedbee, 244 N.C. 682, 683, 94 S.E.2d 837, 838 
(1956). There is considerable authority in partnership law that partnership assets must be 
exhausted before the assets of individual partners can be attached. See Hom's Crane Serv. 
v. Prior, 182 Neb. 94, 95, 152 N.W.2d 421,423 (1967); Young v. Mayfield, 316 P.2d 162, 165 
(Okla. 1957). By analogy, the professional corporation's assets would probably have to be 
exhausted before the separate personal assets of the shareholders could be used to satisfy 
the debt. 
17 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 319A.10 (Supp. 1975) (nullifying all personal vicarious 
liability and granting limited liability); ME: REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 708 (1974) (retaining 
joint and several liability if the shareholder is personally involved in a professional relation-
ship). 
18 See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 12-36-134(g) (1974); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.§ 
47-13A-2(7) (Supp. 1976). 
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In the model provisions the liability of each individual for acci-
dents arising from the rendition of professional services as an 
employee on behalf of a professional corporation is determined by 
the tort law standards normally applicable to an individual profes-
sional.19 The corporation is liable to the same extent as the 
employee if the accident arises from services within the 
employee's apparent authority. 20 But with respect to shareholder 
liability, the Model offers standardized language for each of the 
three main alternatives: limited liability; 21 joint and several liabil-
ity;22 and joint and several liability unless the corporation has 
provided adequate security for financial responsibility, in which 
case all shareholders gain limited liability status. 23 
19 Professional Corporation Supplement to the Model Business Corporation Act, supra 
note 14, at 302, § I l(b): 
Every individual who renders professional services as an employee of a profes-
sional corporation shall be liable for any negligent or wrongful act or omission in 
which he personally participates to the same extent as if he rendered such services 
as a sole practitioner .... 
20 Id. § I l(c): 
Every corporation whose employees perform professional services within the 
scope of their employment or of their apparent authority to act for the corporation 
shall be liable to the same extent as its employees. 
21 Id. § 1 l(d) (Alternate I): 
Except as otherwise provided by statute, the personal liability of a shareholder of a 
professional corporation shall be no greater in any respect than that of a sharehol-
der of a corporation organized under the ____ Business Corporation Act. 
22 Id. § I l(d) (Alternate 2): 
Except as otherwise provided by statute. if any corporation is liable under the 
provisions of subsection (c) of this section, every shareholder of the corporation 
shall be liable to the same extent as though he were a partner in a partnership and 
the services giving rise to liability had been rendered on behalf of the partnership. 
23 Id. § 1 l(d) (Alternate 3): 
(I) Except as otherwise provided by statute, if any corporation is liable under the 
provisions of subsection (c) of this section, every shareholder of that corporation 
shall be liable to the same extent as though he were a partner in a partnership and 
the services giving rise to liability had been rendered on behalf of the partnership, 
unless the corporation has provided security for professional responsibility as 
provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection and the liability is satisfied to the extent 
contemplated by the insurance or bond which effectuates the security. 
(2) A professional corporation, domestic or foreign, may provide security for 
professional responsibility by procuring insurance or a surety bond issued by an 
insurance Company, or a combination thereof, as the corporation may elect. The 
minimum amount of security and requirements as to the form and coverage pro-
vided by the insurance policy or surety bond may be established for each profes-
sion by the licensing authority for the profession, and the minimum amount may be 
set to vary with the number of shareholders, the type of practice, or other variables 
deemed appropriate by the licensing authority. If no effective determination by the 
licensing authority is in effect, the minimum amount of professional responsibility 
security for the professional corporation shall be the product of ____ dollars 
multiplied by the number of shareholders of the professional corporation. 
The model provisions fail to specify whether the corporation must post security ·before 
injury, notice of injury, suit, or judgment in order to gain limited liability. The earliest point 
is preferable in order to prevent corporations from obtaining limited liability after an 
accident but before liability has been established. See Coto. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-
134(g) (1974). The Colorado Act, which specifies the minimum level of insurance, has less 
flexibility than the model provisions, which permit other forms of security and allow 
licensing authorities considerable discretion in setting the amount of security required. 
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II. COMPARATIVE ACHIEVEMENT OF ACCIDENT 
LAW GOALS 
369 
Determining which of these tort liability alternatives is prefera-
ble requires comparison of how well each option accomplishes the 
goals of accident law. In making that determination this note 
employs the schema of accident law developed by Professor Guido 
Calabresi. 24 Calabresi posits two fundamental goals: minimizing 
accident costs and doing so in a fair way. 2 ;; The first goal he 
subdivides into three subgoals: minimizing the number and sever-
ity of accidents; minimizing the social costs of accidents that do 
occur; and optimizing the costs of achieving the subgoals. 26 The 
goal of fairness seeks to ensure that the mechanisms used to 
minimize accidents and their social costs do not deviate unduly 
from other social and ethical values. 27 
A. Minimizing the Number and Severity of Accidents 
Calabresi discusses two methods of minimizing the number and 
severity of accidents. The first method, market deterrence, leaves 
achievement of accident minimization entirely to market forces. 28 
In theory, bargaining in a perfectly competitive market between 
risk-averse buyers and sellers possessing total rationality and cost-
less knowledge of all accident costs29 will reduce the number and 
severity of accidents to the optimal point. 30 The real market is less 
24 G. C:ALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS(l970) 
[hereinafter cited as ACCIDENT CosTs]: Calabresi. Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 
YALE L.J. 656 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Optimal Deterrence]; Calabresi, Dues the Fault 
System Optimally Control Primary Accident Costs, 33 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoe. 429 (1968) 
[hereinafter cited as Primary Accident Costs]: Calabresi, Transaction Costs. Resource 
Allocation and Liability Rules - A Comment, 11 J. LAW & EcoN. 67 (1968) [hereinafter 
cited as Transaction Costs]; Calabresi, The Decision fur Accidents: An Approach tu Non-
fault A/location of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965): Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk 
Distribution and the law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). 
25 ACCIDENT COSTS, supra note 24, at 24. 
26 Id. at 26-28. 
27 Id. at 24. The fairness goal "requires that our many goals not specifically dealt with 
under cost reduction be adequately handled by the proposed system." Id. at 24 n. I. See 
Cramton, Driver Behavior and legal Sanctions: A Study of Deterrence, 67 MICH. L. REV. 
421 (1969). 
28 ACCIDENT COSTS, supra note 24, at 68-69; Primary Accident Costs, supra note 24, at 
432; Calabresi also calls this method general deterrence. 
29 Optimal Deterrence, supra note 24, at 657, 660-61; Transaction Costs, supra note 24, at 
67-68. Pertinent costless knowledge includes knowledge of the risk of injury, risk of negli-
gence by either party, cost of the injury to either party, alternative methods of preventing or 
reducing the injury or negligence, and the costs of those methods. 
30 Transaction Costs, supra note 24, at 67-68. See ACCIDENT COSTS, supra note 24, at 70. 
The optimal point is reached when the cost of achieving greater safety exceeds the savings in 
accident costs that are achieved thereby. See Transaction Costs, supra note 24, at 68. Thus, 
as accident costs increase, their number and severity decrease, both through bargaining and 
as a result of decisions to forego purchasing a good or service with high accident costs or to 
substitute one with lower accident costs. ACCIDENT CosTs, supra note 24, at 73. 
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than perfect, however, for competition is imperfect, knowledge of 
accident costs and safety techniques is costly, and people often act 
irrationally. 31 As these distortions increase, the utility of the mar-
ket approach decreases. 
The other method, collective deterrence, encompasses all acci-
dent minimization decisions made on some societal level and en-
forced without regard to market forces. 32 Collective deterrence 
also operates imperfectly, due to the economic impracticability of 
and societal a version to thoroughgoing regµlation. 33 
Personal fault, the dominant principle of liability in accidents 
arising from the rendition of professional services, 34 combines 
elements of both methods of deterrence. It does so by initially 
depending upon the myriad standards of liability collectively estab-
lished by juries and then leaving each person free to decide in the 
marketplace whether having accidents is worth the price of these 
collectively imposed costs. 35 
I. Deterrent Incentives-Both limited liability and joint and sev-
eral liability are purely market-incentive forms of deterrence. 
Neither enlarges the scope of liability; both merely increase the 
number of sources for payment of the liability. 36 In each the cor-
poration is held fully liable once an employee is found liable under 
the personal fault standard for a work-related accident. 37 Joint and 
31 Transaction Costs, supra note 24, at 69-70; Primary Accident Costs, supra note 24, at 
436. See AcclDENT CosTs, supra note 24, at 55-59, 82-93. These impediments to perfect 
resource allocation are broadly called transaction costs. Polinsky. Economic Analysis as a 
Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 
HARV. L. REv. 1655, 1667 (1974). The primary impediments in the area of professional 
accidents, ignorance, imperfect market structure. and insurance, are discussed in Part II A 
(2) infra. 
32 ACCIDENT COSTS, supra note 24, at 95. 
33 Id. at 76-77, l08-11; Primary Accident Costs, supra note 24, at 431. 
34 Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 627, 633-36 (1973). 
35 Optimal Deterrence, supra note 24, at 660. The deterrent incentives from accident costs 
apply to all persons, not just potential defendants, because a verdict for the defendant in 
effect makes the injured plaintiff liable by not reallocating the cost. Primary Accident Costs, 
supra note 24, at 442 n.20. 
In addition to the immediate cash award from a verdict or settlement, the accident costs 
that generate deterrent incentives include the professional's fear of losing business because 
of a tarnished reputation or a restricted license. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 4731.22(8)(2), 
(6) (Page Supp. 1975) (negligent practice as ground for license res.triction or revocation); 
Statement of George Northrup, in REPORT, supra note 12, at 106; Comment, supra note 34, at 
632, 683. This element of deterrence may decrease if there is a considerable increase in the 
percentage of professionals sued due to the malpractice crises. See Brook, Brutoco & 
Williams, The Relationship Between Medical Malpractice and Quality of Care, 1975 DUKE 
L. J. 1197, 1217. 
36 See James, supra note 5, at 161-63; notes 17-23 and accompanying text supra. 
31 See James, supra note 5, at 161, 210; notes 5, 17-23 and accompanying text supra. In 
nonprofessional corporations the whole award is almost always paid by the corporation 
without any indemnification by the negligent employee. Fleming, The Role of Negligence in 
Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 815, 834 (1967); James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: 
The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 556-57 (1948). Although this phenome-
non does not by itself increase deterrent incentives, it may increase their effectiveness by 
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several liability goes a step further by making each shareholder 
fully and independently liable as well. 38 Because jointly and sever-
ally liable shareholders risk their entire personal wealth as well as 
their shares in the corporate assets, this form of liability creates 
greater financial incentives than does limited liability to reduce the 
number and severity of accidents and does so to the extent that the 
combined assets of the culpable employee and corporation fail to 
satisfy the award. 39 
The likelihood that these combined assets will be insufficient is 
greatest where professional liability insurance is not present. Many 
professionals carry little or no liability insurance, 40 and their num-
ber appears to be rising as professionals react to extreme increases 
in the cost of such coverage in recent years. 41 In this situation long 
run inadequacy of assets to cover liabilities is likely despite the 
significant amount of protection provided by the combined assets 
of the employee and the corporation. 42 
focusing them on one person, the corporation, which is better able to reduce accidents. See 
James, supra note 5. at 172. This phenomenon appears to be largely absent in professional 
corporations because the professional employees usually carry their own insurance. See 
Roddis & Stewart, The Insurance of Medical Losses. 1975 DUKE L.J. 1281. 1291. To that 
extent, the enterprise liability imposed by limited liability and joint and several liability 
creates greater accident minimization incentives only where the employee's inability to 
satisfy the award forces the corporation to contribute its assets. In professional corporations 
these incentives are effectively spread to the shareholders to the extent of their share in the 
corporate assets because professional corporations are almost invariably close corporations 
in which shareholders are intimately involved as professional staff, officers. and directors. 
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (h)(2), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 C.B. 553; Note. supra note 7, at 
783-95; note 6(2) supra. 
38 See note 16 and accompanying text supra. 
39 These additional incentives are composed entirely of the likelihood that some sharehol-
der will be required to pay part of an accident award out of personal resources. The less 
direct financial elements of accident minimization incentives, such as loss of reputation, are 
absent because there is no functional difference between shareholders in a limited liability 
corporation and those in a joint and several liability corporation. See note 37 supra. 
• 0 Among physicians liability insurance has been viewed as indispensable. See Hoffman, 
supra note 12, at 124. Surveys performed in the early l970's attempting to establish the 
percentage of lawyers carrying professional liability insurance placed it between 50 and 80 
percent. See sources cited in Note, Improving Information on Legal Malpractice, 82 YALE 
L.J. 590. 601 n.47 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Legal Malpractice]. For accountants the 
fraction carrying liability insurance was estimated at 75 percent in the early 1970's. See 
Shear, Professional Liapility Problems Among Architects. Engineers, Lawyers, and Ac-
countants, in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, THE SECRETARY'S CoMM'N ON 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: APPENDIX 637, 642 (1973) [hereinafter cited as APPENDIX with 
citations to individual studies]. 
41 Hanahan, Malpractice, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April 1976, at 6; Dixon, 'Going Bare' 
May Be Hazardous t~ Your Fiscal Health, J. LEGAL MED., March 1976. at 23. 
42 The degree of protection depends upon the distribution of accident liability costs and 
the available assets of professional employees and their corporations. Accident liability cost 
data is extremely fragmentary except for physicians, for whom the average claim payment in 
1970 was $10,600 and the estimated paid claim frequency was between 1.4 and 2.2 per 100 
physicians with approximately 40 percent of the claims resulting in some payment. See 
Steves, A Proposal to Improve Cost to Benefit Relationships in the Medical Professional 
Liability Insurance System, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1305, 1312-13, 1315. These figures were derived 
from a universe of insured physicans but should be fully applicable to uninsured physicians 
as well because it is unlikely that physicians willing to take the risk of practicing without 
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The great majority of professionals carry professional liability 
insurance to protect their personal wealth. 43 Several years ago the 
typical degree of coverage was sufficient to satisfy virtually any 
potential tort liability. 44 But the malpractice crises have increased 
both the likelihood and, to an even larger degree, the psychological 
fear that normal coverage will be inadequate. 45 Thus, joint and 
insurance are more prone to negligence or to large awards ·than those protected by insur-
ance. Less than 10 percent of the payments in 1970 exceeded $25,000 and only 3 percent 
exceeded $100.000. See Rudov, Myers & Mirabella, Medical Ma/practice Insurance Claims 
Files Closed in 1970. in APPENDIX, supra note 40. at 13. These larger awards were rarely 
made against only one insured. See Steves. supra, at 1312 (28 percent of all awards and 77 
percent of the awards greater than $100,000 against more than one insured). Current figures 
are not available, but estimates place the rate of increase in average payment at 14-15 
percent per year and at 20 percent per year in payments greater than $25,000, id. at 1315, 
with the rate of increase in claims made at approximately 20 percent per year, id. at 1313-14, 
Calculations on the basis of these estimates indicate that the likelihood of an award in excess 
of $25,000 against a single physician in 1976 was less than 2 percent. Given the fact that 
awards are increasingly made against more than one provider as the amount of the award 
increases. the likelihood of an award greater than $100,000 against a single physician in 1976 
would probably not be greater than 0.5 percent, even though the frequency of these large 
awards appears to be increasing at an even faster rate. Cf. Linster, Malpractice: Striking the 
Reasonable Balance, 43 INS. COUNSEL J. IOI (1976) (reporting an increase in California in 
awards greater than $300,000 from five in 1970 to thirty-five in 1975, an average increase of 
about 45 percent per year). The chances that some employee in a medical professional 
corporation with five professional employees would face liability in 1976 would be about 35 
percent and the chances of liability greater than $100,000 would be over 2 percent. 
Physician income is substantial. The 1973 median net income before taxes of physicians 
was $42,140. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 117 (1975 ed.) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. For incorporated 
physicians the median was $67,500. Id., No. 118. The use of medians yields lower figures 
than the average. Thus, the A.M.A.'s estimates of average income are $50,000 for physi-
cians in general practice in 1973 and much higher averages for both surgeons and group 
practitioners. See Steves, supra, at 1320 n. 72; Brook, Brutoco & Williams, supra note 35, at 
1210-11 nn.56, 61. Assuming that professional salaries have kept pace with inflation, these 
figures would be about 20 percent higher for 1976. 
In order to arrive at an estimate of the adequacy of corporate assets and those of the 
negligent employee to meet the foregoing levels of liability, some assumptions must be made 
because data is not available. One assumption is that the shareholders would intervene to 
prevent a colleague's bankruptcy and sale of the corporation's operating assets. Another is 
that, since liability is relatively rare, the uninsured negligent employee could muster one 
year's salary without contemplating bankruptcy and that the corporation could contribute 
half as much from fairly liquid assets. On these assumptions the average employee and 
professional corporation could generate in 1976 a fund of approximately $90,000. The 
present likelihood of an award in excess of this amount is extremely small, but the fact that 
the frequency and amount of liability have been increasing approximately three times as fast 
as salaries suggests that at some point the available assets of the negligent employee and 
corporation would likely be insufficient. 
43 See notes 40-41 supra. 
44 The statistical chance that one of the awards made in 1970 of over$ 100,000 (3 percent of 
all awards) would be made against one of the 8 percent of insureds carrying less than 
$100,000 in insurance would be substantially below 0.24 percent because only 23 percent of 
the awards over $100,000 were made against only one insured and because physicians in the 
handful of states in which high judgments are prevalent carry higher amounts of insurance. 
Compare Rudov, Myers & Mirabella, supra note 42, at 13, 15, with Steves, supra note 42, at 
1312 n.32. 
45 Many physicians, for instance, have increased coverage from the minimum 
$25,000/$75,000 policy to $100,000/$300,000 or higher (The first figure represents the 
maximum policy coverage per claim, while the second indicates maximum policy coverage 
per year.). Nonetheless, the dramatic increases in claim frequency and severity are likely to 
create a fear of inadequacy. The experience_ of physicians in California provides the best 
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several liability is likely to impose additional incentives, chiefly in 
the relatively small class of cases where insurance is absent, but 
also to some indeterminate degree where normal levels of insur-
·ance are present. 
2. Conversion of Deterrence into Fewer Accidents-It is axioma-
tic that joint and several liability cannot more effectively achieve 
the goal of minimizing acc'idents than limited liability unless its 
additional incentives are actually converted into the marketplace 
into fewer accidents. Arguments have been advanced for the con-
tradictory propositions that the personal fault system substantially 
reduces the frequency of professional accidents46 and that it does 
not have this effect. 47 Only if the first proposition is true can joint 
and several liability be expected to have a favorable impact upon 
accident rates of professional corporations. Unfortunately, the 
empirical data is insufficient to validate either contention. 48 It can 
be shown, however, that market distortions reduce to insignificant 
proportions the class upon which joint and several liability would 
have its intended effect and that on this class it operates quite 
inefficiently. 49 
a. Transfer-In an imperfect market it is generally best to 
confine the allocation of _accident costs as closely as possible to 
those involved in the accidents.50 Because these persons are usu-
ally under the greatest pressure to convert cost incentives into 
fewer accidents and have easiest access to the necessary accident 
cost information, they are likely to be the most efficient at minimiz-
ing accidents. To a considerable extent, however, both classes 
associated with professional accidents avoid these incentives by 
transferring accident costs allocated to them onto others less able 
example. About 10 percent of that state's physician·s faced liability in 1975. Compare Rudov, 
Myers & Mirabella, supra note 42, at I, 13-15 (40 percent of claims result in some payment), 
with Brook, Brutoco & Williams, supra note 35, at I 197 (claim rate of 25 per 100 physician 
policy years in California in 1975). Prior to 1970 the figure was less than half as high. See id. 
In California there were thirteen awards greater than $1 million in a recent 28 month span 
and an increase in awards greater than $300,000 from five in 1970 to thirty-five in 1975. 
Linster, supra note 42, at JOI. Nationwide, the average jury award in medical malpractice 
cases reached almost $350,000 in 1974 compared to $100,000 in 1970. The Doctors' New 
Dilemma, NEWSWEEK, Feb. JO, 1975, at 41 (source: Jury Verdict Research, Inc.). Individual 
judgments have exceeded $4 million. The Patient Becomes the Plaintiff, TIME, Mar. 24, 
1975, at 62. Cf. Suing Your Lawyer, TIME, May 23, 1975, at 93 ($500,000 award against a 
lawyer). 
46 See, e.g., Annas, Katz & Trakimas, Medical Malpractice Litigation Under National 
Health Insurance: Essential or Expendable?, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1346, 1360-61; Wagner, 
supra note 12. 
47 See, e.g., Brook, Brutoco & Williams, supra note 35, at 1220-22. 
48 Id. at 1222. 
49 See notes 50-102, especially note 83, and accompanying text infra. 
• 0 Primary Accident Costs, supra note 24, at 439. In accident law transfer occurs to the 
extent that accident costs are allocated so that no person involved in the accident-prone 
activity carries the burden of these costs. Id. at 440. Transfer is not necessarily undesirable. 
however. since the transferee may actually be better able to improve safety. Id. 
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or willing to achieve greater safety, thereby dissipating much of the 
additional deterrent market incentives provided by joint and sev-
eral liability. 51 
The first element of the professionals' ability to transfer accident 
costs is professional liability insurance. Because the cost of insur-
ance varies according to the rudimentary categories of geographi-
cal location and professional specialty rather than on the basis of 
individual accident experience,"~ insured professionals, including 
those with greater than average accident costs, are able to treat 
their accident costs as a fixed cost of doing business. 53 Since this 
fixed cost is the same for all insured professionals within the same 
broad risk category, consumer price resistance is the only impedi-
ment to the transfer of these costs. 
Consumers, however, have shown little price resistance. This is 
in part due to longstanding and largely successful efforts by profes-
sionals to eliminate price competition between themselves. 54 The 
substantial inelasticity of professional fees also contributes heavily 
to the lack of price resistance. Demand for most professional 
services is rather unresponsive to price variation,55 and profession-
als have vigorously prosecuted as illegal, encroachments upon their 
51 See notes 52-85 and accompanying text infra. 
52 See Steves, supra note 42, at 1319-20; Kendall & Haldi, The Medical Malpractice 
Insurance Market, in APPENDIX, supra note 40, at 533-34, 551-52, 556-57; Legal Ma/practice, 
supra note 40, at 604 n.59. Unintended experience rating may occur, as when an insurer's 
refusal to continue insuring a particular professional forces a switch to a more costly insurer. 
53 See Roddis & Stewart, supra note 37, at 1283-84; N .Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1976, at 22, col. 
2 (A.M.A. study finding that the average cost of an office visit was 96 cents (34 percent of 
total increase in cost of office visit) higher than if malpractice rates had remained at 1973 
levels). It has been suggested that the ability of physicians to pass on liability insurance costs 
is limited by the fact that physicians are prohibited from charging more than the "usual and 
customary" fees to the substantial number of patients whose fees are paid in part by health 
insurance plans. Steves, supra note 42, at 1327. See note 65 infra (insurance statistics). But 
the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans are controlled by physicians, and the "usual and 
customary" level is quite responsive to the wishes of physicians. See Havighurst, Health 
Maintenance Organizations and the Market for Medical Services, 35 LAW & CoNTEMP. 
PRoB. 716, 768-69 (1970). 
Even if these insurance costs were not transferable, professionals might treat them as 
though they were. Thus, the purchasers of auto liability insurance view it as a fixed cost of 
driving and take little cognizance of being placed in a higher risk category so far as changing 
their driving behavior is concerned. See ACCIDENT CoSTs, supra note 24, at 65; Vickrey, 
Auto Accidents, Tort Law, Externalities, and Insurance: An Economist's Critique, 33 LAW 
& CoNTEMP. PROB. 464, 470, 475 (1968). 
54 See notes 73-78 and accompanying text infra. 
55 See with respect to health care services, Havighurst, supra note 53, at 768; Mechanic, 
Problems in the Future of Organized Medical Practice, 35 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 233, 236 
(1970); Reder, Medical Ma/practice: An Economist's View, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION 
RESEARCH J. 511, 558. In the legal profession one need only note its grip on the expertise and 
connections necessary to deal successfully with the burgeoning volume of regulatory and 
administrative law. See also Schuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the 
Canons as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 244,253 (1968). Certified public 
accountants have their indispensability assured by the legal requirements of annual financial 
audits. 
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allocated areas of monopoly power, those cheaper substitutes that 
would increase price elasticity .56 Other factors, such as casualty 
insurance,57 tax deductions,58 and the nature of the professional 
relationship,59 also diminish price elasticity. Finally, the minor 
responsiveness that do.es exist is relatively insensitive to the acci-
dent cost component of professional fees, both because that com-
ponent is small proportionally60 and because professional services 
tend to be non standardized with little price comparability. 
Another important source of low price resistance is the ability of 
consumers to disguise or transfer the accident costs imposed on 
them. The various types of health insurance exemplify this pro-
cess. Because health insurance premiums rarely vary with the 
health costs of the individual insured except indirectly with age, 
the additional benefit to any single health care consumer from 
additional use of insurance benefits is far greater than that indi-
vidual's additional cost.61 Consequently, those within each risk 
category are encouraged to increase their own usage even if they 
realize that ultimately their own costs will also rise. 62 The disre-
gard for health care costs that drives up usage also tends to cause 
disregard of the accident cosl component of health care costs. 63 
56 Carlson. Health Manpower Licensing and the Emerging Institutional Responsibility for 
the Quality of Care, 35 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 849, 850-51, esp. 851 n.7 (1970); Note, 
Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 79 YALE L.J. 1179, 1182 (1970). See also Pitts, Group 
Legal Services: A Plan to Huckster Professional Services, 55 A.B.A.J. 633 (1969); Note, 
Lay Divorce Firms and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 6 U.MICH. J.L. REF. 423 (1973). 
The quarterly publication, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS, is devoted exclusively to 
reporting bar efforts to repel incursions upon its traditional areas of activity. For many years 
organized medicine staunchly opposed the prepaid group practice of medicine. See 
Havighurst, supra note 53, at 717, 739; Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in 
Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, 84 HARV. L. REv. 887, 954-60 (1971). With regard to the 
monopoly power of professionals, see notes 73-79 and accompanying text infra. 
57 See notes 61-69 and accompanying text infra. 
58 I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 213. See Roddis & Stewart, supra note 37, at 1284. 
59 Once an individual or organization establishes a relationship with a professional, the 
individual or organization is usually reluctant to terminate the relationship. Confidence 
takes precedence over cost. 
60 As a percentage of national health care costs, the cost of professional liability insurance 
to all health care providers was estimated to be less than 0.5 percent during 1970 and a 
maximum of 1.5 percent in 1975. See Steves, supra note 42, at 1317. Physicians spent 1.3 
percent of their gross income on professional liability insurance in 1970 and approximately 
6.7 percent in 1976. Id. at 1318. As a fraction of the typical office visit cost, the percentage is 
somewhat higher. Cf. N.Y. Times, supra note 53 (A.M.A. study implying figure of about 15 
percent). The cost of professional liability insurance in other professions is a significantly 
lower percentage of fees. Cf. Legal Malpractice, supra note 40, at 600-01 nn.46, 50 (average 
individual annual cost of about $130 for professional liability insurance for 55,000 lawyers in 
1969). 
61 Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: A Comment, 58 AM. EcoN. REV. 531, 534 
(1968). See Havighurst, supra note 53, at 742. 
62 ACCIDENT CosTS, supra note 24, at 65; Pauly, supra note 61, at 533, 536. Cf. Lave & 
Lave, Medical Care and its Delivery: An Economic Appraisal, 35 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 
252. 259, 263 (1970) (stating that costless health care has stimulated demand). See also 
Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: A Further Comment, 58 AM. EcoN. REv. 537. 538 
(1968) (suggesting some possible limitations on the conclusion). 
63 See ACCIDENT COSTS, supra note 24, at 65. 
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This is not transfer as technically defined, 64 but it has an even more 
adverse effect on incentives to minimize accidents because it 
causes the incentives to evaporate rather than to be shifted to 
another class. Fringe benefit health insurance, common in the 
United States,65 carries this phenomenon one step further by dis-
guising the fact that the employees pay for the insurance by forego-
ing higher wages. 66 
Social welfare programs, primarily Medicare and Medicaid, pro-
duce transfer of costs in the classic sense. Because the government 
pays the cost of covered services,67 the beneficiaries have almost 
no economic incentives to minimize accidents. 68 Further, in prac-
tice governmental assumption of these health costs has dissipated 
their deterrent power as market incentives. 69 
The absence of price resistance enables professionals to pass on 
all of their insurance and accident costs that do not exceed policy 
limits. Since typical policy limits are sufficient to satisfy all but 
very large awards, 70 jointly and severally liable shareholders are 
insulated almost completely from personal liability where the neg-
ligent employee is insured. The absence of price resistance also 
enables uninsured professionals to pass on most of their accident 
costs. By charging the same fees as insured professionals, unin-
sured professionals recoup the cost of insurance each year and, 
64 See note 50 supra. 
65 In 1973 private health insurance plans met 75.3 percent of all personal health expendi-
tures for hospital care and 48.5 percent for all physican's services. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 
supra note 42. at 72. It should be noted that these figures include employee contribution 
plans as well as those paid for by employers. 
66 The employer treats the insurance costs as a wage item, whereas the employees treat it 
as an employer cost since they never see it being deducted from their paychecks. 
67 In 1973 government expenditures for personal health care were 36.6 percent of total 
expenditures for personal health care. Medicare and Medicaid accounted for 22.8 percent of 
that total. Preliminary figures for 1974 show an increase to 37.6 percent and 25.0 percent, 
respectively. Total dollar value of these public expenditures was $30 billion in 19.73, and 
preliminary figures for 1974 show an increase to $34 billion. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra 
note 42. at 70. 
68 Costs such as diminished physical capacity and pain remain uncompensated to the 
extent not borne by governmental rehabilitation and relief programs. 
69 For instance, in Medicare and Medicaid the federal government originally cast itself as 
a disinterested third-party payment fund. See Stevens & Stevens, Medicaid: Anatomy of a 
Dilemma, 35 LAW &·CoNTEMP. PROB. 348,408 (1970). The inability inherent in this system 
of nonsupervision to police the quality of care soon led to unbearable levels of fraud by 
health care providers. In order to combat fraud, the federal government took the extraordi-
nary step of freezing physician fees under Medicaid in 1969, id. at 412-14, but in 1976 the 
amount of health care provider fraud in the two programs was estimated to be $3.9 billion 
per year, approximately 15 percent of the cost of the two programs. Compare Billions in 
Medicaid Ripoffs; Can Anyone Stop It?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 22, 1976. at 
18. with STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 42, at 70. Even where the government has 
attempted to use its buying power as a lever to reduce the number and severity of accidents, 
it has imposed collective regulation rather than market incentives and thereby has elimi-
nated the potential deterrent superiority of joint and several liability pro tanto. 42 U .S.C. § 
1320c-c(19) (Supp. 1975) (mandatory peer review program required by all health care 
providers applying for Medicare or Medicaid payments). 
10 See notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra. 
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therefore, over time should be able to pass on at least the average 
cost of accidents with the same freedom with which insured pro-
fessionals pass on accident costs not exceeding their policy 
limits. 71 When coupled with the available assets of the negligent 
employee and corporation, transfer thus enables shareholders 
whose employees are uninsured to obtain insulation from all but 
extremely high awards. 72 
Beyond the levels just indicated, the degree of transferability 
cannot be determined. Its contours can, however, be suggested by 
professional monopoly power. One basis of this monopoly power is 
the mandatory licensing laws, which allocate to each profession 
certain areas of legal monopoly by erecting barriers to entry. 73 
Despite competition at the fringe of each allocation 74 and fairly low 
entry barriers to some professions, 75 the classic cartel powers 
granted to professionals in the form of licensing laws and self-
regulation have often been abused to reduce intraprofessional 
71 This phenomenon is possible because insurance offers protection against only two 
contingencies, liability sooner than average and liability greater than average, AccmENT 
CosTs, supra note 24, at 48, and because ;;:ach variation in 'insurance cost according to 
geographical location, functional risk, or policy coverage causes insurance to approximate 
that much more closely the results of the market without any insu~ance, id. at 48-49. See 
note 72 infra. Of course, this method of transfer will not work for all since some will face 
liability sooner or greater than average. But even these individuals may be able to borrow 
against future savings. 
72 The average premium for $25,000/$75,000 professional liability insurance for all physi-
cans in 1975 was $984. Steves, supra note 42, at 1319. Since the average liability frequency 
in 1975 was about five occurrences of liability per 100 physician policy years, see note 42 
supra, nearly $20,000 could be saved between each occurrence of liability if rates remained 
constant. Liability risk varies greatly by geographical location and specialty, and thus the 
$984 average varies from $273 in New Hampshire to $3,348 in California, id., and from 
$6,648 in New Hampshire to over $77,000 in California for the .1ighest risk class of surgeons 
at a policy level of $1 million/$3 million, id. at 1319-20. This variation means that employees 
in specialties or in states with higher liability experience will be able to save much greater 
amounts. Consequently, just as the $20,000 average savings roughly equals the increase in 
average liability between 1970 and 1975 (based on the 14 percent rate of annual increase 
reported in note 42 supra), so the savings of each employee in each risk category would 
roughly equal the insurance costs for professionals in the same state and risk category at 
locally prevalent risk levels. See note 71 supra. Indeed, the elimination of broker's fees and 
other overhead costs should enable uninsured professionals to save more than the average 
amount. 
73 Barron, Business and Professional Licensing-California, a Representative Example, 
18 STAN. L. REV. 640, 643-44 (1%6); Lave & Lave, supra note 62, at 260; Comment, 
Occupational Licensing: An Antitrust Analysis, 41 Mo. L. REv. 66 (1976). 
74 Elson, Canon 2-The Bright and Dark Face of the Legal Profession, 12 U. SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 306,308 (1975); Schuchman, supra note 55, at 253; Worrnser, supra note I, at 217. 
75 For years there have been many lawyers with only marginally profitable practices, a 
situation intimating the absence of unduly high entry barriers. See Note, Legal Ethics and 
Professionalism, 79 YALE L.J. 1179, 1180-81 (1970). But even within law there have been 
entry barriers to the most prestigious jobs. Id. Organized medicine, on the other hand, has 
restricted entry successfully for many years. See Kessel, Higher Education and the Na-
tion's Health: A Review of the Carnegie Commission Report on Medical Education, 15 J. 
LAW & EcoN. 115 (1972); Kessel, The A.M.A. and.the Supply of Physicians, 35 LAW & 
CoNTEMP. PROB. 266 (1970). 
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competition and thereby produce monopoly profits. 76 Among the 
obvious examples are the anti-information and anti-advertising 
policies of the professions 77 and the adjudicated antitrust violations 
of organized medicine and law. 78 Another basis of professional 
monopoly power is the absence of price elasticity as previously 
discussed.rn 
The power to charge excessive fees naturally includes the power 
to transfer accident costs by concealing them in the fee structure 
used. The magnitude of this power can only be approximated 
because of the difficulty of eliminating other factors. But estimates 
of $1.5 billion per year in excessive legal fees 80 and between $1 and 
$7 billion of "defensive medicine" charges designed to minimize 
malpractice claims and liability81 suggest that limitations on the 
76 Elson. supra note 74, at 308; Havighurst, supra note 53, at 739; Kessel, Higher 
Education, supra note 75, at 119; Comment, Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules and 
the Antitrust Law, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1164 (citing estimate by Group Legal Institute of 
California of $1.5 billion of excess legal fees per year). 
77 Barron. supra note 73. at 654-56, 664. See Havighurst, supra note 53, at 768; Note, 
supra note 75, at 1182; cf. Kessel, Transfused Blood, Serum Hepatitis, and the Coase 
Theorem, 17 J. LAW & EcoN. 265, 285 (1974) (noting that lack of hospital advertising 
reduces the information flow important in reducing the incidence of serum hepatitis); 
Roemer. Controlling and Promoting Quality in Medical Care, 35 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 
284. 288 (1970) (stating that many ethical strictures are really designed to control competi-
tion). 
The organized bar has engaged in efforts to restrict the flow of information about legal 
services in violation of constitutional free speech rights. See, e.g., United Trans. Union v. 
State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971) (upholding right of union to recommend that its members hire 
specified Illinois attorneys to handle their Federal Employment Liability Act actions in 
Michigan in order to assure competent counsel at not greater than a 25 percent contingent 
fee); UMW, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (reversing on first 
amendment grounds an injunction that prevented union from maintaining salaried legal staff 
to. assist its members in asserting their legal rights); Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Virginia 
ex rel. Virginia State Bar. 377 U.S. I (1964) (reversing injunction that prevented union from 
channeling most of the legal work of its members to specific lawyers through recom-
mendations). The A.B.A. has recently amended its canon of ethics to liberalize the permis-
sible limits of lawyer advertising. Code Amendments Broaden Information Lawyers May 
Provide in Law Lists, Directories, and Yellow Pages, 62 A.B.A.J. 309 (1976), but the 
Department of Justice has nevertheless filed an antitrust action against the A.B.A. in the 
belief that the modified restrictions continue to violate the Sherman Act, United States v. 
American Bar Ass'n, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,r 45.076 (N.D. Ill. 1976). 
78 American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (affirming violation of 
Sherman Act by A.M.A. in conspiring to obstruct the business of a group health organiza-
tion by coercing A.M.A. members to refuse employment by the organization and consulta-
tion with its employees); Goldfarb v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (affirming violation of 
Sherman Act by integrated state bar and private county bar association through promulga-
tion and enforcement of minimum fee schedules). See Kessel, Price Discrimination in 
Medicine, I J. LAW & EcoN. 20 (1958); Rayack, Restrictive Practices of Organized 
Medicine, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 659 (1967); Comment, supra note 76; Comment, The 
American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 
YALE L.J. 937 (1954); Note. supra note 75. at 1182. 
79 See notes 55-60 and accompanying text supra. 
80 See Comment, supra note 76, at I 164. 
81 See Reiger, The View from HEW on Federal Involvement in the Malpractice Situation, 
J. LEGAL MED., June 1975, at 19 (reporting HEW official's estimate of $2-7 billion per year 
in the use of defensive medicine); Wolfe, The Real Victim, TRIAL, May/June 1975, at 26, 30. 
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power to transfer accident costs are rather negligible in both pro-
fessions. This is particularly true for professional corporations, 
because they appear to be composed of wealthier professionals82 
who probably possess greater than average market power. 
Some less wealthy, uninsured professionals with little market 
power undoubtedly form professional corporations sometimes 
motivated by the prospect of limiting their liability despite the 
unavailability of the tax advantages which usually prompt incor-
poration. Although the prevalence of wealth, insurance, and mar-
ket power among professionals presently restricts the size of this 
class rather severely ,83 it is the only one upon which joint and 
several liability is likely to have a significant effect. Statistically, 
shareholders in this class clearly risk personal liability unless they 
react to market incentives by acting more safely in their employee 
capacity. 84 Analysis of the impact of consumer and professional 
ignorance, and other primary distortion to the market, suggests, 
however, that joint and several liability incentives will be ineffi-
cient even in this situation.85 
b. Ignorance-In order to convert market incentives efficiently 
into fewer accidents, those faced with the incentives must know, at 
a relatively low cost, the risks and costs of injuries and negligence 
as well as the methods and costs of reducing them. 
Consumers of professional services are typically ignorant of the 
It has also been argued that defensive medicine does not exist. See Brook, Brutoco & 
Williams, supra note 35, at 1218, 1220. As argued in Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the 
Medical Ma/practice Dilemma, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1179, I 189-92, the conflict in opinion is 
probably largely due to the concomitance of the definition of defensive medicine in terms of 
medically unjustifiable procedures and the absence of agreement as to what procedures are 
justifiable. In the absence of agreement, defensive medicine becomes a function of subjec-
tive intent, and it is known that many physicians admit to engaging in what they view as 
defensive medicine. See Bei-nzweig, Defensive Medicine, in APPENDIX, supra note 40, at 38. 
Even if the amount of defensive medicine is only$ I billion per year, the low end of the 
estimates, it equals the total amount of health care provider professional liability insurance 
premiums paid in 1975. See Steves, supra note 42, at 1317 n.59. In other words, physicians 
appear to be able to pass on not only the cost of their insurance but also an equivalent 
amount of unnecessary costs to avoid having to pay more for insurance. 
82 See note 42 supra. 
83 More than 80 percent carry professional liability insurance. See note 40 supra. It is 
likely that a fair number of the uninsured have substantial wealth and market power because 
the income of incorporated physicians is higher than the national average. See note 42 supra. 
84 If it is assumed that such employees earn half of the average income and that the 
corporation has no liquid assets, the fund generated in a physician professional corporation 
according to the sources in note 42 supra would be $30,000, whereas the likelihood of 
liability greater than $30,000 in a corporation of five professional employees would be about 
8 percent in 1976. In addition, the smaller chances of very large liability bee;ome more 
important as the available assets dwindle. Although, outside the health care professions, 
those who are not wealthy and have little market power are less likely to render services in 
matters where large sums of money are at stake, these practitioners may also be more likely 
to cut comers. Cf. Note, supra note 73 (discussing problems of solo practitioners). 
85 See notes 86-102 and accompanying text infra. 
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risk of injury and even more ignorant of the subsidiary risk that 
negligence, whether their own or the professional's, will cause the 
injury. 86 One of the chief sources of consumer ignorance is the 
nature of the professional relationship. Those receiving profes-
sional services typically surrender their judgment to the profes-
sional's diagnosis, recommendation, and treatment, thereby be-
coming highly dependent. 87 Partially because the professional 
often fails to reciprocate by admitting relative incompetence in a 
specific area88 or explaining the assessment of the problem and 
risks of various types of treatment, 8H the consumer's dependency 
may become so total as to culminate in somewhat of a psychologi-
cal paralysis. 90 
Another important source of consumer ignorance is the disor-
ganized way in which professional services are purchased. In 
theory the personal fault system lends itself to reliable generaliza-
tions on the basis of the myriad case-by-case determinations of the 
proper standard of conduct.Ht These generalizations could be used 
by consumers to avoid risky procedures and incompetent profes-
sionals and to pressure professionals for safer procedures. But 
consumers have never organized in such a way so as to collect this 
information.H 2 Rather, they continue to rely almost entirely on the 
professional' s judgment. 
86 See Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance" -A No-Fault Approach 
to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974 INs. L.J. 69, 73; Mechanic, supra note 
81, at 1186-87; Peterson, Consumers' Knowledge of and Attitudes Toward Medical Mal-
practice, in APPENDIX, supra note 40, at 658. Most individuals would be shocked to discover 
that they face nearly a IO percent chance of sustaining injury each time they are admitted to 
a hospital and that about 30 percent of those injuries are due to the negligence of the health 
care provider. That only 6 percent of those negligently injured file a claim of any sort 
suggests that ignorance prevails. See Pocincki, Dogger & Schwartz, The Incidence of 
Iatrogenic Injuries, in APPENDIX, supra note 40, at 50. Few individuals are aware that 50 
percent of the legal malpractice awards involve the simple failure by the lawyer to file suit or 
papers within the applicable statute of limitations or court-imposed deadline. See Legal 
Malpractice, supra note 40, at 599 n.41. Unsophisticated investors are unable to judge the 
adequacy of accountants' work on corporate financial statements. 
87 See Lave & Lave, supra note 62, at 742; Comment, supra note 34, at 645. 
88 See Waxman, Spiraling Costs: A Health Care Slide, TRIAL, May/June 1975, at 23, 24. 
89 See Wolfe, supra note 81, at 27. 
90 This paralytic dependency on the professional's judgment may be illustrated by the 
case of the steelworker with a broken leg who, told to report back to the hospital in four days 
for an examination ·of the cast and further x-rays, lost his leg because he failed to report back 
earlier even though the foot became blue. See Wee ht, Medicine: A Commercial Enterprise?, 
TRIAL, May/June 1975, at 39, 40. 
91 Primary Accident Costs, supra note 24, at 442-44. The extent of ignorance about 
whether either party has been negligent may also be judged from the fact that the immense 
costs of administering this case-by-case system, see Brook, Brutoco & Williams, supra note 
35, at 1208 (less than 20 percent of each premium dollar returned to patient who has won a 
claim), stem largely from the cost of discovering whether the conduct of either party caused 
the accident or was substandard. See Dietz, Baird & Berul, The Medical Malpractice Legal 
System, in APPENDIX, supra note 40, at IOI, 154; Keeton, Compensation for Medical 
Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 594 (1973); Legal Malpractice, supra note 40, at 593. 
92 See Kessel, supra note 77, at 281,285,289; Legal Malpractice, supra note 40, at 594; 
cf. note 158 infra (substantial amount of unnecessary surgery). 
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The substantial lack of knowledge of the causes and costs of 
professional accidents that plagues professionals themselves 
underlies consumer ignorance and also forms an independent 
obstruction to accident minimization through market incentives. 
Despite extensive training and the use of sophisticated technology 
and procedures, most professional judgments are inherently im-
precise.!13 Overcoming imprecision creates additional complexity 
in professional skills, which in turn increases the difficulty of 
satisfying legal standards of sound practice.B-1 This is particularly 
true in medicine, where the development of powerful drugs and 
new surgical techniques with low tolerance for error has increased 
the potential efficacy of medical treatment as well as the risks of 
additional injury _B 5 This complexity and instability makes identifi-
cation of risks and utilization of safety techniques more costly and 
may render collective attempts at detailed standard setting imprac-
ticable even at excessive costs. !16 The atomistic organizational 
structure of the professionsn and the absence of economic incen-
tives to minimize accident costsB 8 further inhibits compilation of 
the data necessary to identify precisely the nature and actuarial 
costs of risks!Hl and development of appropriate accident minimiza-
93 See Bernzweig. Getting to the Root of the Problem. TRIAL, May/June 1975. at 58. 59; 
Brook. Brutoco & Williams, supra note 35, at 1209; Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 86, 
at 94; Mechanic, supra note 81. at I 181; Comment, supra note 34, at 631. 
94 Hanahan, supra note 41, at 16; Separate Statement of James E. Ludlam, in REPORT, 
supra note 12, at 130. See Hoffman, supra note 12, at 124. 
95 See Brook, Brutoco & Williams. supra note 35, at 1209; Mechanic, supra note 81, at 
1181-82. 
96 See Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 86, at 94. 
97 Lawyers and accountants practice in firms more frequently than other professionals. 
Nonetheless, nearly half the nation's attorneys practice alone. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 
supra note 42, at 163. Law partnerships average five practicing attorneys. Id. In Michigan 
there were in 1974 only twenty-one firms with more than twenty active lawyers, 3 
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY (1975 ed.), despite the fact that the state had 
roughtly 8,000 practicing lawyers. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 42. at 162. In 1970 
only 15 percent of the nation's physicians practiced as members of a medical group. Carlson, 
supra note 56, at 854, 856 n.24, 861. 
98 See notes 40-84 and accompanying text supra. 
99 Professionals do come into contact with organizations-such as professional schools, 
insurers, licensing boards, professional associations at city, county, state, and national 
levels, hospitals, and courts-of sufficient size and number to allow compilation of the 
necessary data base. But usually these contacts are tenuous. or the organization has little 
interest in minimizing accidents. Thus. insurers have not gathered comprehensive accident 
data on malpractice claims. Wolfe, supra note 81, at 30; legal Malpractice, supra note 40, at 
590, 598-99. See Reiger. Resolution Sought for Malpractice Crisis, J. LEGAL MED., June 
1975, at 35, 36. Courts and regulatory bodies are interested almost exclusively in licensing 
and discipline. REPORT, supra note 12, at 51-52; Wolfe, supra, at 27; legal Malpractice, 
··supra note 40, at 595. Professional trade organizations have typically concentrated their 
efforts on improving the social and financial status of their memberships rather than on 
collecting information necessary to reduce unnecessary losses associated with their mem-
bers' services. See notes 83-86 and 91 and accompanying text infra: REPORT, supra. at 
51-52; legal Malpractice, supra, at 595. But see Kendall & Haldi, The Medical Malpractice 
Insurance Market, in APPENDIX, supra note 50, at 545-46; legal Malpractice, supra note 40, 
at 608 n.82. 
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tion techniques .10° Further, the minimal correlation between the 
negligent act and the amount of injury 101 may prevent development 
of techniques for selectively avoiding the most severe injuries, 
which are the only ones capable of providing professionals with 
significant market deterrent incentives. 
One of the great problems with respect to joint and several 
liability is that those subject to its additional incentives are no more 
capable of overcoming the existing ignorance about professional 
accidents than are those not subject to joint and several liability. 
As a result, jointly and severally liable shareholders are restricted 
to more effective application of present knowledge instead of being 
able to use their financial incentives to develop new knowledge. 
This may reduce the number and severity of accidents somewhat, 
but it can hardly be commensurate with the additional incentives 
placed upon them. The extreme inefficiency of market incentives 
in the professional context appears to assure that even those 
shareholders whose employees and corporations have few assets 
and little market power are unable to utilize market incentives with 
any efficiency to reduce the number and severity of professional 
accidents. 102 Consequently, the additional accident minimization 
to be gained by use of joint and several liability is negligible in all 
but a few instances. 
B. Minimizing the Social Costs of Accidents 
Although accident costs are in the first instance borne by those 
involved, they are often spread to society through loss of work and 
100 See Roemer, supra note 77, at 289, 295. The organizations with which professionals do 
come into contact have failed to be concerned adequately with reducing accidents. REPORT, 
supra note 12, at 51-52; Brook, Brutoco & Williams, supra note 35, at 1215-17; Havighurst & 
Tancredi, supra note 86, at 96; Leiser, Hospital Administrators: Passing Muster?, TRIAL, 
May/June 1975, at 42; Mechanic, supra note 55, at 235-36; Parker, Periodic Recertification 
of Lawyers: A Comparative Study of Programs for Maintaining Professional Competence, 
1974 UTAH L. REV. 463, 464, 467; Roemer, supra note 77, at 289-90, 294; Warren, The 
Discipline of Physicians, J. LEGAL MED., Sept./Oct. 1974, at 23, 26; Wolfe, supra note 81, 
at 27; Note, Legal Specialization and Certification, 61 VA. L. REV. 434, 435 (1975); Legal 
Malpractice, supra note 40, at 595. 
The atomistic organizational structure and economies of scale make the market for safety 
devices fragmented and difficult to reach. Cf. Lave, Safety in Transportation: The Role of 
Government, 33 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 512, 517 (1968) (markets for transportation safety 
devices). 
101 See Mechanic, supra note 81, at 1181. 
102 Usually, the shareholders are also the employees. See note 37 supra. The inefficiency 
of joint and several liability does not mean that no reduction in the level of accidents occurs 
as a result of its imposition. But efficiency is so low that the incentives may not be worth 
imposing if accident minimization is the only goal to be achieved thereby. Of course, joint 
and several liability may be more useful to other goals, such as minimizing the social costs of 
accidents after they occur. See note 111 and accompanying text infra. 
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reliance upon social welfare programs. io:i The reduction of these 
societal costs forms Calabresi' s second subgoal. 104 He identifies 
two methods of achieving this objective. One, loss spreading, is 
based upon the assumption that accident costs will be less burden-
some on individuals if spread among people and over time. This is 
accomplished primarily through public and private casualty and 
liability insurance. 10:; The second method, called '"the deep poc-
ket" by Calabresi, utilizes the further assumption that accident 
costs become less burdensome to society when assumed by those 
least likely to suffer painful economic or social dislocation from the 
imposition of those costs 1 on and depends for its realization upon 
mechanisms such as enterprise liability and the progressive income 
tax. i o; 
I. Conceptual Superiority of Joint and Sel'eral Liability-The 
personal fault system does not seek to minimize the social costs of 
accidents. 108 It demonstrates this blindness to minimizing the 
overall burden by holding negligent defendants liable or leaving the 
costs on plaintiffs when negligence is not proved, without consid-
eration of the relative economic position of either party. 10B On the 
other hand, joint and several liability, as well as limited liability, 
does tend to diminish the likelihood of social and economic disloca-
tion to injurer and injured alike by spreading the loss to additional 
payment sources and increasing the fund available for compensat-
ing the injured individual. The larger fund minimizes the victim's 
dislocation, while the spreading of the loss to additional sources 
reduces the burden on the injurer. 110 In any given professional 
corporation joint and several liability creates a broader asset base 
and a larger potential fund than that available with limited liability. 
Consequently, it is in theory the superior minimizer of dislocation 
to both injurers and injured and hence of societal accident costs as 
well. 
103 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 42, at 116, 280, 281, 285, 286, 295, 296, 299, 
300, 577; cf. Sinha, The Problem uf the Application of the Fault Principle tu Automobile 
Accidents. 14 VILL. L.J. 386, 398-402 (1969) (data concerning the financial allocation of 
automobile accident costs). 
10
• ACCIDENT COSTS, supra note 24, at 27, 39. 
10
• Id. at 39-40, 46-49. 
106 Id. at 40. 
107 Id. at 53-54. 
108 In practice the personal fault system rarely operates by itself. Usually it operates in 
conjunction with the loss spreading devices of casualty and liability insurance. ACCIDENT 
COSTS, supra note 24, at 24-26, 289-309. For conceptualization of the problems dealt with 
here, however, the personal fault system must be considered separately from its adjuncts. 
10
• See Optimal Deterrence. supra note 24, at 657. 
110 In this context loss spreading combines with the deep-pocket method. Professional 
corporations are likely both to have assets sufficient to avoid dislocation if the loss is placed 
upon them (deep pocket) and to be able to spread the losses among the consumers of their 
services. 
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2. Practical Superiority of Joint and Se1·eral Liability-In prac-
tice the superiority of joint and several liability over limited liability 
as a method of minimizing the social costs of accidents varies with 
the adequacy of the assets of the corporation and the professional 
actually at fault. Where these assets are sufficient to satisfy any 
foreseeable tort awards, the two types of liability are virtually 
indistinguishable since the additional asset base and larger poten-
tial fund of joint and several liability need not be utilized. But 
where these assets are insufficient, joint and several liability is 
superior because it produces a greater fund for the victim while 
spreading the source of the funds in order to reduce dislocation to 
the injurer. 
With respect to the goal of minimizing social costs, the likelihood 
that the combined assets of the negligent employee and corporation 
will be insufficient is quite small. 111 But the use of joint and several 
liability to minimize social costs in these rare cases is more easily 
justified than its use to minimize the number and severity of acci-
dents because in the latter situation the incentives of joint and 
several liability are largely dissipated by ignorance of how to use 
them, whereas no such inefficiencies occur in the minimization of 
social costs. 
C. Choosing the Optimal Method of Minimizing 
Accidents and Their Social Costs 
Optimization involves a cost-benefit analysis aimed at achieving 
the greatest reduction in accidents and in their social costs at the 
lowest possible administrative cost. 112 This analysis is difficult 
because the subgoals of deterrence and cost spreading conflict with 
each other as do the two methods of deterrence. 113 Often the only 
practical method of optimizing costs is delegation, the allocation of 
costs to that class of persons most likely to reach the optimal 
distribution in the marketplace. 114 
111 Indeed, the likelihood is no greater than that with respect to minimizing the number 
and severity of accidents. See notes 42, 45, 70-72, 80-82, 85 and accompanying text supra. 
112 ACCIDENT COSTS, supra note 24, at 28. 
113 /d. at 29, 93, 131-34; Primary Accident Costs, supra note 24, at 436-38. 
114 Primary Accident Costs, supra note 24, at 438. Calabresi develops three cumulative 
criteria for making a sound delegation. ACCIDENT CosTs, supra note 24, at 143-52; Primary 
Accident Costs, supra note 24, at 439-40. The first criterion. involves finding the optimal 
cost-benefit relationship between accident avoidance costs and administrative costs. For 
instance, if the cost of discovering that hospitals could avoid surgical accidents most cheaply 
would greatly exceed the cost of the additional accidents that would occur from leaving the 
avoidance incentives on physicians in general, the first criterion would suggest leaving the 
incentives with the less efficient but ultimately less costly physicians. The second criterion 
is avoiding a delegation to a class that can have little impact on reducing those accidents 
unless it is so much cheaper administratively to put the incentive on that class that it 
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Determining the optimal method of reducing the costs of acci-
dents arising from the rendition of professional services is beyond 
the scope of this note. 115 Here the inquiry is confined to the 
relative optimality of limited liability and joint and several liability. 
Joint and several liability appears to be optimal where the assets of 
the corporation and the professional at fault are clearly inadequate 
to meet anticipatable accident costs. In this situation the clear and 
important gains in reducing social costs116 more than counterbal-
ance the inefficiency of joint and several liability in reducing the 
number and severity of accidents. 117 But where assets are 
adequate, limited liability appears to be comparatively optimal 
because accidents and social costs are minimized efficiently with-
out the wasteful psychological fear that may exist in joint and 
several liability situations. This shift in optimality from one type of 
liability to the other depending on the adequacy of the assets 
suggests that the third alternative model solution, which utilizes 
each given concept of liability where optimal, rather than a single 
concept exclusively, would be the optimal solution for all profes-
sional corporations. 
D. Fairness 
In applying Calabresi's schema to professional accidents, fair-
ness may be viewed as a reasonable balance between the conflict-
ing social goals of minimizing accidents and encouraging necessary 
and beneficial professional activitiesY 8 Although Calabresi has 
used the concept of fairness primarily to demonstrate the unfair-
ness of the whole personal fault and loss spreading system that 
dominates American accident law, 119 fairness may also be used in a 
more limited, comparative manner to aid choosing between alter-
native elements within an existing accident law system. In this 
context the optimal model solution (the third alternative) would 
also be sufficiently fair if no overriding claim can be presented by 
the victim class for exclusive use of the additional safeguards of 
becomes the least expensive way despite the consequent 'inefficiency in accident reduction. 
Putting the costs of surgical accidents on farmers would be an example of this inoptimality, 
which Calabresi calls externalization. The third criterion requires delegation to the class 
most likely to be able to make bargains in the marketplace to correct mistakes in delegation. 
115 It is clear, however, that absolute optimality would require a fundamental restructur-
ing of the market for professional services or much greater reliance upon collective regula-
tion. See notes 164-171 and accompanying text infra. 
116 See ACCIDENT Cosrs, supra note 24, at 44; Fleming, supra note 37, at 824-25; James, 
supra note 37, at 558. 
111 See notes 46-102 and accompanying text supra. 
118 See note 27 and accompanying text supra. 
11
• See sources cite<j in note 24 supra. 
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joint and several liability or by the injurer class for the additional 
protection available to them through limited liability. 
1. Joint and Several Liability-The argument for the greater 
fairness of joint and several liability rests on the belief that the 
public needs special protection from exposure to professional in-
competence and imposition. 120 Special protection has taken many 
forms including licensing requirements, 121 regulatory boards, 122 
judicial and legislati vt: prohibiiions of professionai corporations, i 23 
and the development of a wide range of tort doctrines. 124 
The public protection approach has severe limitations. Outside 
of the health care sector, the vast majority of professional service 
consumers are commercial clients in a position to judge the quality 
of services performed. In addition, since few physicians 125 and 
barely half of the nation's attomeys 126 practice in firms, joint and 
several liability can affect only a small proportion of professionals. 
The widespread ignorance among professionals concerning the 
causes of accidents and the appropriate methods of reducing acci-
dents contributes to the diversion of attention from reducing acci-
dents to avoiding liability, thereby further diminishing the potential 
effectiveness of joint and several liability. 127 
A more fundamental weakness in the public protection argument 
arises from the fact that joint and several liability fails to offer 
greater protection wherever the assets of a firm are sufficient to 
meet anticipatable accident costs. 128 Since professional corpora-
tions normally have adequate assets in the form of liability insur-
120 See note 7 and accompanying text supra. 
121 Barron, supra note 73, at 643-44; Graves, Professional and Occupational Restrictions, 
13 TEMPLE L.Q. 334 (1939). 
122 In addition to administering mandatory licensing systems, regulatory boards also 
oversee entrance requirements, standards of ethical conduct and disciplinary charges and 
hearings. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 317.400, .590 (1971). For a variety of 
reasons, these boards have been ineffective in improving performance. See REPORT, supra 
note 12, at 51-60; Brook, Brutoco & Williams, supra note 35, at 1215-17; Havighurst & 
Tancredi, supra note 86, at 96; Warren, supra note 100, at 26. 
123 See note 2 and accompanying text supra. 
12 • Several doctrines easing the plaintiff's case such as informed consent, res ipsa 
loquitur, and postponement of the statute of limitations, have been liberally applied against 
physicians. See REPORT, supra note 12, at 27-33; Dietz, Baird & Berul, supra note 91, at 
122-52; Kessel, supra note 77, at 280; Kroll, The Etiology, Plus and Prognosis of Medical 
Malpractice, 8 SUFFOLK L. REV. 598, 607-20 (1974); Roddis & Stewart, supra note 37, at 
1299-1300. Architects, engineers, and accountants have lost the defense that formerly 
restricted liability exclusively to those with whom they had had a contractual relationship. 
See Gormly, Accountants' Professional Liability-A Ten-Year Review, 29 Bus. LAW 1205 
(1974); Comment, Recent Statutory Developments Concerning the Limitation of Actions 
Against Architects, Engineers, and Builders, 60 KY. L.J. 462 (1972). The exposure of 
lawyers is discussed in Comment, supra note 34, at 635-45. 
125 See note 97 supra. 
12s 1d. 
127 See notes 93-101 and accompanying text supra. 
128 See note 39 and accompanying text supra. 
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ance, fairness does not require exclusive use of joint and several 
liability. Further, the phenomenon of defensive medicine may ac-
tually be producing a retrograde effect which the exclusive use of 
joint and several liability would fuel. 129 
2. Limited Liability-The argument for the exclusive use of 
limited liability for professional corporations rests on two grounds. 
The first is that professional corporations are entitled to the same 
advantages afforded other corporations. However, not all 
shareholders of all other corporations have limited liability for all 
purposes. 130 More importantly, limited liability is a legislative crea-
tion131 designed to stimulate the passive investment necessary for 
rapid industrialization and commercial growth. 132 Professional 
corporations fail to produce these benefits, however, because pas-
sive investment in professional corporations is both impractical1 33 
and severely restricted as a matter of law134 and because profes-
sional corporations are created not to foster commercial growth 
but to minimize taxes. 135 Finally, where contractual debt far ex-
ceeds potential tort liabilities, as was true of the original beneficiar-
ies of limited liability, limited liability is far less significant than it- is 
in professional corporations, where potential tort liabilities far 
exceed contractual debt. This is because potential contract cred-
itors can easily circumvent limited liability by requiring personal 
129 This effect would occur if, as has probably happened, the addition of oi:te dollar of 
liability would spawn greater than one dollar of additional cost for defensive medicine. See 
note 81 supra. 
130 See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 630 (McKinney 1963). 
131 At common law no organization is entitled to limited liability. See Comment, The 
Validity of Limited Tort Liability for Shareholders in Close Corporations, 23 AM. U. L. 
REV. 208, 210 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Limited Tort Liability]. Until 1930 the shareholders 
of California corporations were subject to joint and several liability. Comment, lnadequte 
Capitalization as a Basis for Shareholder Liability: The California Approach and a Rer:om-
mendation, 45 So. CALIF. L. REv. 823, 832 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Inadequate 
Capitalization]. 
132 Limited Tort Liability, supra note 131, at 212; Inadequate Capitalization, supra note 
131, at 833. 
133 The capital requirements of most professional corporations are so low and the propor-
tion of income from services so high that an equity investment in a professional corporation 
would earn almost nothing. Indeed, since the primary motivation for forming professional 
corporations was to secure more favorable tax treatment, see note 8 and accompanying text 
supra, the directors of a professional corporation would seek to minimize the amount of the 
corporation's net income dividends payable. 
Professional corporations are not materially different from many other close corporations 
with respect to passive investment because close corporation financing agreements are 
frequently conditioned on consent by the principal shareholders to become personally liable 
for the debt. W. CARY, CORPORATIONS 22-23 (1969). The proper solution, however, is not 
limited liability for. all but greater exposure to tort liability on the part of shareholders in all 
close corporations, as both courts and commentators have suggested. See Walkovszky v. 
Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414,420,223 N.E.2d 6, 9,276 N.Y.S.2d, 585, 589-90(1966);/nadequate 
Capitalization, supra note 131, at 830; Comment, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable 
for the Torts of Their Corporations, 76 YALE L.J. 1190, 1196 (1967). 
134 See note 6(2) supra. 
135 See note 8 and accompanying text supra. 
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guarantees from shareholders on financing agreements, whereas 
potential tort victims cannot plan ahead to secure a waiver of 
limited liability .136 
The second argument for exclusive use of limited liability is that 
it would help decrease the present socially harmful overexposure 
of professionals to tort liability. 137 Professionals have in recent 
years witnessed a dramatic increase in potential tort liability as a 
result of the greater frequency and severity of claims, and the 
expanding catalogue of legal bases for such claims. 138 The mag-
nitude of this increase is most evident in the medical profession, 
where between 1960 and 1974 medical malpractice insurance costs 
increased fifteen times as quickly as the substantial rise in health 
care costs 139 and where the cost of liability insurance is estimated 
to have reached $2 billion in 1976. 140 Increased exposure has in 
some respects harmed the relationship between health care provid-
ers and their patients. 141 The substantial losses of scarce medical 
services due to the time requirements of defending against claims 
have.disrupted the health care delivery system, 142 while the use of 
defensive medicine has appreciably increased the costs of medical 
care without any corresponding medical benefits. 143 
Professionals have used this argument successfully in winning 
legislative atrophication of the basis of liability 144 and claim sever-
136 See Limited Tort Liabiity, supra note 131, at 208 n.3. 
137 Advocates of reduced liability for health care providers point to two types of social 
harm. The first is that extremely large tort recoveries by a small minority of health care 
consumers excessively increase the cost of medical care to all consumers. See Hoffman, 
supra note 12, at 123; Linster, supra note 42, at 103; Perr, The Great JAILer Conspiracy-
Malpractice, Torts, and the Middle Class, J. LEGAL MED., March 1976, at 16. The second 
is that overexposure to liability disrupts the trust and good will that must exist between the 
professional and the patient and therefore damages the quality of health care. See Hoffman, 
supra note 12, at 123; Keeton, supra note 91, at 598-600. 
138 See Steves, supra note 42, at 1312-19; note 124 supra. 
139 In 1970 the average premium rates for physicians other than surgeons stood at 540 
percent of a 1960 base; for surgeons the figure was 940 percent. REPORT, supra note 12, at 
13. This is an annual rate of increase of nearly 20 percent for both categories combined. 
Since 1970 these costs have been estimated to be rising at an annual rate of over 23 percent. 
See Steves, supra note 42, at 1316. Linear extrapolation through 1974 yields an increase of 
1400 percent over the 1960 base, almost fifteen times the 95 percent increase in the cost of 
health care between 1%0 and 1974. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 42, at 71. 
140 Steves, supra note 42, at 1317 n.59. 
141 See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 12, at 19; Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 86, at 95; 
Hoffman, supra note 12, at 123. But cf Brook, Brutoco & Williams, supra note 35, at 1221 
(noting that changing social attitudes may be more important factors than malpractice 
litigation). 
142 See REPORT, supra note 12, at 36; Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insurance'-' -Has 
Its Time Come? 1975 DUKE L.J. 1233, 1234; Mechanic, supra note 81, at 1180. 
143 See note 81 and accompanying text supra. 
144 Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice 
Crisis, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1417. Legislatures have shortened statutes of limitations and mod-
ified exceptions to them. Id. at 1429-36. They have also restricted the doctrines of informed 
consent. id. at 1436--42, and res ipsa loquitur, id. at 1426-29. 
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ity .145 However, using joint and several liability to force one pro-
fessional to assume part of another professional's liability has 
nothing to do with the amount of liability imposed, the reason for 
imposing it, or the likelihood that a claim will be made. It also has 
little to do with the use of medically unjustified procedures to avoid 
claims and liability. Consequently, elimination of joint and several 
liability among shareholders of professional corporations would 
have no meaningful impact on the exposure of professionals to 
liability. Even if such a result were possible, the societal goal of 
adequate compensation to those tortiously injured while receiving 
professional services would counsel strongly against exclusive use 
of limited liability in professional corporations. 
Inasmuch as neither joint and several liability nor limited liability 
presents an overriding claim to being more fair in all situations, the 
amalgamation alternative of the model solution appears to be both 
optimal and fair. It is preferable to the exclusive use of either of the 
traditional types of shareholder liability. Indeed, its preservation of 
each type of liability in the circumstances in which it serves the two 
policies of encouraging professional activities and preventing and 
compensating injuries from those activities suggests that the mod-
el's utilization of three alternatives is an unnecessary deviation 
from the goal of greater uniformity aimed at by model legislation. 
III. PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL 
LIABILITY 
Adoption of the third alternative model solution would have the 
salutary effect of foreclosing avoidance of liability as a motive for 
professional incorporation. But the relative rarity of corporate or 
shareholder liability assures that neither the model solution nor any 
existing shareholder liability provision can have any substantial 
impact upon the malpractice crises. Elimination of these crises in a 
fair manner might be aided, however, by modification of the pro-
fessional corporation form. Indeed, the confluence of three factors 
-the decreasing usefullness of the professional corporation for tax 
and organizational purposes, the growing realization that the per-
sonal fault system is an extremely inefficient and inappropriate 
145 Modifications include specific dollar limitations on total recovery by the claimant, id. 
at 1418-25, reduction in maximum contingent fee percentages, id. at 1442-47, requirements 
for reducing the award by the amount of collateral payments, id. at 1447-50,-and elimination 
of ad damnum clauses. in litigated complaints, id. at 1451-53. 
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method of minimizing professional accidents and compensating 
their victims, and the availability of serious proposals to alter the 
personal fault system in the context of professional accidents-
suggests that the professional corporation may be an attractive 
vehicle for wide-ranging state experimentation with alternative 
professional accident law systems. 
As noted earlier, professional corporations were originally 
formed and have been used primarily to gain the tax advantages 
given to corporations by the federal government. 146 In recent 
years, however, these advantages have diminished, 147 and future 
reform is likely to further reduce the tax differences between 
corporations and partnerships. Adoption of the third alternative 
model solution with respect to shareholder liability would also 
remove the socially undesirable use of incorporation as a technique 
for avoiding liability. Inasmuch as the professional corporation 
form may actually hinder the flexible operating structure .desirable 
in professional practices, 148 diminution of the nonorganizational 
benefits of incorporation has increasingly made the professional 
corporation a form without function. The corporate form is a 
vehicle of legislative policy and should be adaptable to new pur-
poses if the professional corporation form no longer serves its 
original objective. 
The inability of the personal fault system to deter professional 
negligence and compensate its victims has been demonstrated with 
particular persuasiveness in the area of medical accidents. 149 The 
percentage of each dollar of professional liability insurance pre-
mium reaching successful medical malpractice claimants is lower 
than in any other area of personal injury litigation. 150 Many claims 
146 See note 8 and accompanying text supra. 
147 See note 13 and accompanying text supra. Some courts have held that partners qualify 
as employees for purposes of employee deductions, thereby substantially reducing the 
differences between corporations and partnerships. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 
F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1968) (finding that a five percent partner serving as resident manager of 
partnership's ranch operation was an employee for purposes of I.R.C. § I 19 deduction for 
value of meals and lodging supplied by the partnership and noting that the result would be 
the same under § 707(c) by virtue of its incorporation of§ 61, which incorporates § I 19). 
148 A partnership agreement may be designed to secure as much centralization of man-
agement as exists in a corporation. See Brand v. Elledge, IOI Ariz. 352,419 P.2d 531 (1966); 
Potter v. Brown, 328 Pa. 554, 195 A. 901 (1938); Frost, Some Comments as to Professional 
Corporation Statutes, 4 ARIZ. L. REV. 169, 170 (1963). Most states impose restrictions on 
professional corporations concerning multi-state practice, see note 6(4) supra, to which 
partnerships are not subject because they are treated as an aggregate of individuals. Further, 
the professional independence required by professional ethics laws and explicitly preserved 
by the various professional corporation acts may prohibit professionals from making full use 
of corporate management structures. See Note, supra note 7, at 781-82. 
149 See REPORT, supra note 12, at 100; Havighurst, supra note 142, at 1234-36; Keeton, 
supra note 91. 
150 REPORT, supra note 12, at JOO; Brook, Brutoco & Williams, supra note 35, at 1208 
(citing figure of 18-20 percent). Lawyers handling medical malpractice claims have estimated 
that these claims require about four times as many hours as other personal injury cases. 
Dietz, Baird & Berni, supra note 91, at IOI. 
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never receive an adequate hearing because proper advocacy would 
cost more than the claim is worth or because evidentiary problems 
exist. 151 Claims are never filed for hundreds of thousands of negli-
gent incidents per year. 152 Litigation is abrasive, produces 
economically and medically wasteful procedures, interruptions, 
and antagonisms, and utilizes a rather vague and unscientific 
standard of liability which produces arbitrary results. 153 Further, 
its financial incentives to achieve greater safety are sloughed off by 
physicians and dissipated by patients. 154 
Each proposal to modify substantially the personal fault system 
attempts to rationalize the compensation system by predicting 
compensation on an adverse result or an iatrogenic injury155 alone 
rather than on an iatrogenic injury plus the capricious causal ele-
ment of negligence. The plan supported by the American Medical 
Association achieves this improvement by mandating that all 
employers carry medical accident casualty insurance for their 
employees .156 Because this plan is designed to remove all market 
and collective forms of minimizing accidents, 157 it would only be 
worthy of consideration in the unlikely event that medical accident 
rates could not be diminished. 158 The Inouye-Kennedy proposal1 59 
counterbalances the externalization of accident costs to a national 
insurance pool by imposing regulatory quality controls on par-
ticipating physicians .160 
151 See Dietz, Baird & Berul, supra note 91, at I 53; Keeton, supra note 91, at 596. 
152 See Steves, supra note 42, at 1308-12; compare STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 42, 
at 80, 83, with Pocincki, Dogger & Schwartz, supra note 86, at 50. 
153 See Havighurst, supra note 142, at 1234-35; Hoffman, supra note 12, at 122-24; 
Mechanic, supra note 81, at I 188; Steves, supra note 42, at 1300. Hoffman's criticism that 
the tort system is being applied much more harshly to physicians than other professionals 
appears to be justified, especially in light of the self-serving and primitive requirement in 
legal malpractice litigation that injury can only be proved by establishing that the plaintiff's 
action or defense would have succeeded if the attorney had not been negligent. See Legal 
Ma/practice, supra note 40, at 593. 
154 See notes 49-102 and accompanying text supra; cf. Brook, Brutoco & Williams, supra 
note 35, at 1220-22 (asserting that the threat of a malpractice claim has a minimal impact on 
improvement of performance); Havighurst, supra note 142, at 1243 (statement by Senator 
Inouye that physicians practice good medicine in spite of malpractice threats). 
155 Iatrogenic injuries are those produced inadvertently by the physician or treatment. See 
Pocincki, Dogger & Schwartz, supra note 86, at 51. 
156 See Havighurst, supra note 142, at 1241, 1243-44. 
157 Externalizing compensation costs by placing them on the victims' employers elimi-
nates market incentives because employers, who would enjoy tax deductions for the cost of 
the plan, are no more likely to press for cost control than they are under current medical 
casualty insurance plans which are deductible fringe benefits; it eliminates collective deter-
rence because employers, unlike the government, are unable to regulate physicians. See 
Havighurst, supra note 142, at 1243-44. 
158 Accidental injury due to the substantial amount of unnecessary surgery fostered by the 
fee-for-service system of health care, see Mechanic, supra note 55, at 245; Steves, supra 
note 42, at 13 JO, is one area where fairly quick gains in accident reduction could be made. 
Serum hepatitis from blood transfusions appears to be another such area. See Kessel, supra 
note n; Steves, supra note 42, at 1309 n.19. 
159 S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
160 Id. §§ 1704, 1731 (federalization of health care professional licensing and renewals). 
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In contrast to this trade-off of reduced market for greater collec-
tive incentives, Professor Clark Havighurst proposes to increase 
market incentives while, if necessary, decreasing collective regula-
tion. In his proposal health care providers automatically compen-
sate patients for any of a limited list of specific adverse outcomes 
with a liability insurance program that utilizes extensive individual 
experience rating and deductible or co-insurance features in order 
to strengthen market incentives to avoid medical accidents. 161 The 
additional costs of compensating a higher percentage of victims are 
expected to be covered by savings resulting from elimination of the 
administrative costs of determining fault. 162 An independent varia-
tion of this plan devised by Professor Jeffrey O'Connell may affect 
but does not explicitly consider the problem of deterrence; it en-
yisages voluntary contractual arrangements between physicians 
and patients in which both parties give up recourse to litigation in 
favor of no-fault compensation of specified adverse outcomes. 163 
There are severe problems with both the collective and market 
approaches to minimizing professional accidents. The extensive 
political power of physicians and other health care providers and 
their longstanding opposition to governmental and internal regula-
tion 164 make it unlikely that new regulations will be strong enough 
to reduce accident rates substantially .165 Certainly, regulations 
recently imposed by some states as trade-offs for alleviation of the 
liability insurance crisis have been rather innocuous. 166 Gov-
ernmental regulation of professional activities almost invariably 
controls the inputs and processes rather than the outcomes of 
professional services delivery .167 Input and process controls, how-
ever, are difficult and expensive to apply and modify .168 Further, 
161 See Havighurst, supra note 142, at 1233-34, 1251-52. 
162 Id. at 1249, 1271-72. 
163 O'Connell, An Elective No-Fault Liability Statute, 1975 INS. L.J. 261. 
164 See Chapman & Talmadge, Historical and Political Background of Federal Health 
Care Legislation, 35 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoa. 334, 341, 343 (1970); Domette, Role of the 
Healing Arts Licensing Board in the Current Medical Ma/practice Crisis, J. LEGAL MED., 
March 1976, at 9, 10; Kessel, supra note 77, at 180, 279-83; Leiser, supra note 100, at 43; 
Mechanic, supra note 55, at 235-36, 238-39, 246, 250; Parker, supra note 100, at 467, 476; 
Roemer, supra note 77, at 289-90, 294; Stevens & Stevens, supra note 69, at 415; Warren, 
supra note 100, at 23, 26. Cf. Parker, supra note 100, at 464, 470-71 (accountants and 
lawyers); Pierce, The Code of Professional Responsibility in the Professional World: An 
Abdication of Professional Self-Regulation, 6 U. M1cH. J.L. REF. 350, 353 (1973) (lawyers); 
Note, supra note 100, at 435 (lawyers). 
165 Havighurst, supra note 142, at 1244-46. 
166 Although continuing education and relicensure requirements have been imposed in 
some states, see, e.g., M1cH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 388.1810(7) (1976); OHIO REv. CODE 
ANN. § 4731.281 (Supp. 1976) (Page ed.); Wis. STAT. AN. § 655.017 (West Supp. 1976), more 
thorough regulation, such as extension of the Professional Standards Review Organization 
concept to all physicians, has not been enacted. 
167 Havighurst, supra note 142, at 1244. Even the legal standards and evidentiary re-
quirements of personal fault litigation are process-oriented. Id. at 1238. 
168 See id. at 1244. 
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their incompatability with the historical professional desire for 
independence may produce a mentality of formal compliance with-
out the desired byproduct of better performance. 169 
On the other hand, the substantial market power of professionals 
that has been traced by this note suggests that combinations of 
individualized experience rating and deductibles or co-insurance 
would have to be very expensive, perhaps unrealistically so, to 
produce sufficient incentives among professionals to avoid acci-
dents.110 This will continue to be true so long as the federal tax 
structure permits professionals to deduct liability insurance pre-
miums and tort liability expenses. 171 And if adverse outcomes 
prove to be unavoidable without large-scale changes in the 
technology and art of professional care, nontransferable market 
incentives might be a merely punitive measure devoid of social 
benefit. 
Because professional corporation status is voluntary, any mod-
ification of the personal fault system would have to be made 
palatable enough to retain a professional corporation population 
sufficient for use in gauging the modification's success. Havighurst 
seeks to achieve acceptability by avoiding the abrasive waste of 
litigation, removing the emphasis on process in personal fault liti-
gation, and reducing collective controls; 172 the Inouye-Kennedy 
approach prefers reducing market incentives .173 Since neither 
proposal is likely to reduce the number of accidents without con-
trols or incentives that are significantly greater than at present, the 
favorable trade-off may remain unachievable. The suitability of a 
voluntary mode of experimentation, as in the professional corpora-
tion, is also open to question in light of the probability that market 
deterrence alternatives would attract primarily those who thought 
they stood to gain from extensive experience rating because of 
their lower than average accident cost experience, while collective 
deterrence alternatives would attract primarily those whose unfor-
tunate accident experience suggested that avoidance of all accident 
costs would be desirable. Such a phenomenon would detract from 
the validity of any conclusions drawn from the control group. 
Nevertheless, experimentation remains imperative if the goals of 
equitably minimizing accidents and their social costs are to be 
169 See notes 164-65 and accompanying text supra. 
110 See notes 54. 73-82 and accompanying text supra. Potentially, a countervailing 
monopsony would be necessary to internalize accident costs. But this is not achievable with 
respect to professional corporations alone and therefore cannot be used to achieve internali-
zation at politically acceptable levels of individualization. 
171 See Havighurst, supra note 142, at 1250 n.50. CJ. id. at 1240 (noting thaJ third-party 
payments make the practice of defensive medicine easier). 
172 Id. at 1238-40, 1249-50, 1267, 1278 n.133. 
173 S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1701-03, 1711-15 (1975). 
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served. The professional corporation thus remains a fairly attrac-
tive vehicle for experimentation. Because the form is malleable and 
less useful to professionals than previously, little would be lost by 
requiring acceptance of an alternative accident law system as a 
condition of gaining or retaining professional corporation status. 
Because professional corporations account for a small percentage 
of professional services rendered, the relative merits of competing 
and problematical systems could be gauged in advance of any 
large-scale commitment. Because professional group practices ap-
pear to attract, in the health care sector at least, a greater than 
normal percentage of malpractice claims, 174 professionals practic-
ing in groups may be particularly willing to try an alternative. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This note has examined the various shareholder tort liability 
provisions in the professional corporation legislation, including the 
nearly completed Model Professional Corporation Supplement. In 
light of the objectives of accident law, the preferable provision is 
the third model alternative, which makes each shareholder jointly 
and severally liable unless the corporation demonstrates financial 
responsibility for such harm, in which case no shareholder is liable 
in a shareholder capacity. 
Because the personal fault system allows individuals in the mar-
ketplace to decide whether to pay the costs of negligently caused 
accidents or to act more safely, it might be thought that the addi-
tional liability potential from joint and several liability would make 
that form of liability preferable so far as the goal of deterring 
accidents is concerned. But the use of liability insurance, the 
relative wealth and market power of most professionals, and the 
lack of price resistance by consumers to noncompetitive fees as-
sures that almost all professional accident costs are transferred to 
consumers and either dissipated by them or transferred to the 
government, whose insubstantial prevention regulations do not 
utilize shareholder liability for deterrence purposes. Further, in the 
rare instances in which professional corporation shareholders are 
not insulated from liabilty, their additional financial incentives to 
174 In 1970 only 15 percent of the nation's physicians practiced as members of a group. 
Carlson, supra note 56, at 854, 856 n.24, 861. But in the same year physicians practicing in 
groups (partnerships, associations, and professional corporations) were involved in 33.1 
percent of the medical malpractice claims closed. See Rudov, Myers & Mirabella, supra 
note 42, at 16. 
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minimize accidents are largely ineffective because the shareholders 
are subject to the same ignorance about causes and costs of profes-
sional accidents and their prevention that makes it difficult for 
professionals and consumers to reduce the number and severity of 
professional accidents. Consequently, the theoretical deterrent 
superiority of joint and several liability is negligible in the actual 
context of professional accidents. Indeed, where the corporate 
assets are sufficient to meet reasonably anticipatable awards, joint 
and several liability may foster counterproductive practices, such 
as defensive medicine, rather than help to reduce accidents. 
Because joint and several liability assures a larger number of 
sources and a larger fund for payment of negligently injured per-
sons, it appears to be the preferable form of liability with respect to 
the accident law goal of reducing economic and social dislocation 
to both the victim and the injurer. But the widespread use of 
liability insurance and the wealth of professionals restrict the prac-
tical application of this feature of joint and several liability to very 
few instances. 
Although joint and several liability is not effective in all situa-
tions and may be counterproductive in some, it is clearly the most 
effective type of liability where the available assets of the negligent 
employee and corporation are inadequate. Because the third alter-
native model provision utilizes joint and several liability in just 
these circumstances and retains limited liablity in all others, it 
achieves the deterrence and social cost goals of accident law more 
effectively in the aggregate than does either limited liability or joint 
and several liability alone. 
The final goal of accident law is fairness, which involves resolu-
tion of the conflicting social goals of encouraging professional 
activities and minimizing accidents. As compared to the preferred 
model provision, neither joint and several nor limited liability has 
any overriding claim of greater fairness which requires its exclu-
sive use. Joint and several liability is not fairer because it is rarely 
needed and may be counterproductive in some situations. Limited 
liability is not fairer because professional corporations fail to offer 
the passive investment and commercial development which limited 
liability was designed to foster and because limited liability for 
shareholders cannot meaningfully affect the excessive malpractice 
liability that in recent years has impaired the delivery of profes-
sional services. 
This note has also discussed the possibility of adapting the pro-
fessional corporation form to help solve the malpractice crises, 
which stem in large part from the unfairness of the personal fault 
system. Several alternatives to the fault system in the professional 
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accident context that are worthy of careful consideration have 
been proposed. Although the politically powerful oppositon of 
professionals to regulation and their substantial market power may 
make it difficult to make an alternative palatable on a voluntary 
basis, the pressing need for change and the decreasing usefulness 
of the professional corporation form for its original tax-minimizing 
function suggest that it may be an effective vehicle for experimen-
tation with these proposed alternatives. 
-Richard Tunis Prins 
